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COMMENTARY

The Malpractice Problem-Its Cause and Cure:
The Physician's Perspective
JAMES J. STEWART*

The medical malpractice problem in Indiana is one of recent origin.
One need look back only a few years to discover a situation in which
the filing of a malpractice action was rare, and settlement or recovery
was even less frequent.' The reasons are evident:
(1) There was a close rapport between physician and patient,
who occasionally paid his doctor bill with produce in place of cash.
(2) The "locality rule" 2 and "conspiracy of silence"3 made recovery against the physician difficult even where the plaintiff presented
a meritorious claim.
(3) Claim consciousness,' prevalent among the populace today,
was virtually non-existent. In recent years there has been an escalation
of all types of insurance claims, with a concomitant broadening of the
nature and scope of personal injury and damage claims.' For many
years the majority of personal injury claims were directed against railroads or other industrial entities, pitting the employee against his employer. With the advent of the automobile, the automobile accident
* A.B. 1934, Butler University; J.D. 1937, Indiana University; Partner: Stewart, Irwin,
Gilliom, Fuller & Meyer, Indianapolis, Indiana.
'The average award in malpractice cases during the period 1970-1975 was $282,403.
The average award during the period 1930-1970 was only $23,127. Bloomington Daily
Herald-Telephone, Jan. 14, 1975, at 1, col. 1.
2 See Worster v. Caylor, 231 id. 625, 110 N.E.2d 337 (1953); Adolay v. Miller, 60
Ind. App. 656, 111 N.E. 313 (1916). The standard by which a physician's actions are
judged in determining whether they constituted negligence is that of the skill and knowledge of physicians with a similar practice in similar localities. Thus a physician in a rural
area would not be required by law to exercise the skill and knowledge of a physician in a
large metropolitan teaching hospital. With increased communication throughout the country, the rationale for this rule has been lost.
I See, e.g., Gould v. Winokur, 98 N.J. Super. 554, 237 A.2d 916 (1968). Physicians,
because of professional loyalty and insurance company pressure, will often refuse to give
the expert testimony needed to establish the standards of knowledge and skill against which
a defendant's conduct will be measured. Without this expert testimony, a plaintiff often
cannot meet the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of negligence.
4
See D. LouIsELL & H. WII.Lmr.s, MEDICAL. MALPRACTICE 1 5.09 (1973).
5 Medical claims are increasing at about 8-10 percent per year. See generally DEP'T OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL
MALPRACTCE (1973) [hereinafter cited as ComasissIoN REPORT].
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became a principal source of personal injury claims and, after the
passage of workmen's compensation laws,6 the automobile accident became the major source of personal injury litigation.
Perhaps the modern malpractice dilemma can be traced to Robert
Keeton and Jeffrey O'Connell's forceful advocacy of "no-fault" automobile insurance." These theorists were first considered radicals by the
legal profession, and their theories were scorned by most observers.
However, "no-fault" proponents were not easily discouraged, and
within a few years the first "no-fault" legislation was enacted. 8 At this
writing several states have "no-fault" automobile insurance laws,'
and federal legislation is threatened." There is no denying that the
proliferation of "no-fault" automobile legislation has restricted the
practice and diminished the earnings of personal injury lawyers for
both plaintiffs and defendants. Indeed, some students of the malpractice
problem have advanced the theory that the first signs of general acceptance of "no-fault" legislation and theories marked the advent of the
malpractice boom." Responsible studies have demonstrated the early
development, and rapid increase, of malpractice claims in the states
where the "no-fault" laws were first enacted. Unquestionably, "nofault" accelerated the development of the products liability action, a
6

See,

eg., IND. CODE § 22-3-3-1 et seq. (Burns 1971), the Indiana Workmen's Com-

pensation Statute which was enacted in 1929.

7R. KEEToN & J. O'CoNNELL, BAsIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC Vicr= : A BLUE-

PRINT FOR REFoR3ING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE

(1965). The authors criticized the applica-

tion of negligence theory to automobile accidents, and proposed an alternative which would
make reparation for certain physical injuries not dependent on the presence or absence of
primary or contributory negligence. Liability was to be placed on the insurance company
of the driver who was injured or whose passengers were injured. This type of compensation plan is commonly referred to as "no-fault" compensation.
8 MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 90 § 34A et seq. (1975).
9
See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-4014 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1973); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§10-4-701 et seq. (1973): CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-319 (Supp. 1975); DEL. CoDE
ANN. tit. 21 § 2118 (1974 Supp.); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.730 et seq. (1972); HAWAII REv.
STAT. § 294-1 et seq. (1974 Supp.); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 73 § 165.150, repealed by P.A. 781297 § 22 (Cum. Supp. 1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-3101 et seq. (1973); VID.ANr. CoDE
art. 48A § 538 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1974); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 90 § 34A et seq. (1975);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 72A.149 (1968); NEv. REv. STAT. § 698.010 et seq. (1973); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 39:6A-1 (1973); NEw YORK INS. LAw § 670 (Supp. 1974); ORE. REv. STAT. § 743.786
et seq. (1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40 § 1009.101 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1975); P.R. LAws
ANN. tit. 9 § 2051 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31-41-1 et seq. (1953);
VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-380.1 (Cum. Supp. 1975). Some of this legislation has come under
constitutional attack. See, e.g., Grace v. Howlett, 51 111. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972);
Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1, 271 N.E.2d 592 (1971). See generally Note, A Constitutional Perspective on the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act, 51 IND. L.J. 143 (1975), infra.
' 0 See S. 354, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), introduced by Sen. Philip Hart, and HR.
10, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973), introduced by Rep. Moss.
I Cf. Brant, Medical Malpractice Insurance: The Disease and How to Cure It, 6 VAPo.
U.L. REv. 152 (1972), where the author views the interest in medical malpractice as
prompted by the same symptoms that brought about discussion of auto insurance and the
various no fault proposals.
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natural forerunner of the professional liability claim. Escalation of the
number of malpractice claims in Indiana has occurred at an amazing
rate, as evidenced by the studies of the two major professional liability
carriers in this state.
By late 1974 doctors were convinced that "trial" lawyers had
methodically and deeply furrowed their domain. Moreover, the attorneys were systematic in their approach, publishing and circulating
data on the ways and means of sucecssfully establishing the malpractice
action. Thus, when Dr. Gilbert Wilhelmus, of Evansville, Indiana,
was elected president of the Indiana State Medical Association in
October 1974, he resolutely declared that he was directing his entire
regime to an attack on the malpractice problem,' 2 and the association's
attorneys were enlisted in this effort. A "team" of attorneys, which
included Geoffrey Segar of the Indianapolis firm of Ice, Miller, Donadio
& Ryan, Mark Gray of Kightlinger, Young, Gray & De Trude, and
this writer, undertook to draft remedial legislation for the consideration
of the legislature. Implicit in the decision to undertake this project was
the conviction that remedial legislation was essential to the preservation
of the health care system.
The basis and validity of this conviction was recently illustrated
by an article published in Best's "Insurance News Digest." The author
noted that the office of the California Legislative Auditor General contends that seven California insurance companies ultimately will pay
out $183,000,000 more on malpractice insurance claims than they have
collected in premiums during the last fifteen years. Furthermore, "[o] f
the total paid claims costs . . .claimants receive approximately 56 per-

cent, attorneys about 40 percent, and direct costs other than legal
accounted for the remaining 4 percent.""
Thus, it is no wonder that the medical profession has cast a jaundiced eye upon the legal profession. In fact, we found that many doctors,
particularly those least informed of the details of the problem, tended
to blame first the lawyers, and secondly the insurance companies, for
their dilemma. That malpractice insurance costs had become excessive
and were going to increase was not disputed, even by the plaintiffs'
bar. Two frequently cited examples are illustrative.
Last spring, while we were in the throes of attempting to write
the new Indiana statute, I received a long distance telephone call from
a San Francisco pediatrician. He had a small clinical practice in con"2See

67 J. IND. ST. MED. ASS'N, President's Page (1974).

13 Insurance Educator: California Medical Malpractice Study, 213(14) THE WEE=-Y
UNDERwRiTER 20 (Oct. 11, 1975).
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junction with other pediatricians. Their business had reached the point
where they felt justified in employing an anesthesiologist. For this
reason they secured the services of a young man who had just completed
his residency and who had not yet entered private practice. The pediatricians agreed to pay him a salary of $42,000 a year, providing him, of
course, with a fully equipped office. They did stipulate, however, in
view of the insurance problems prevalent among California physicians,
that it would be necessary for him to make arrangements to obtain
his own liability insurance. When the anesthesiologist attempted to procure liability coverage, he discovered that most companies were not
interested in insuring him at all. He finally found one company which
was willing to write a policy for a $32,000 a year premium, a sum
which constituted 75 percent of his income before taxes.
The other example occurred here in Indianapolis. On December
23, 1974, Community Hospital announced that it was discontinuing
all elective surgery because its anesthesiologists were unable to renew
their insurance policies. 4 A real crisis was narrowly averted when the
Insurance Commissioner of the State of Indiana, through a little arm
twisting, induced one of the few carriers who was still writing liability
insurance in Indiana to take the risk, at substantially increased rates,
for a trial period pending developments in the Indiana legislature."5
The rates for the anesthesiologists increased some 500 to 600 percent. 6
In the beginning doctors also blamed the insurance companies,
claiming that such escalation in premiums was a "rip off" and unconscionable. The doctors had great difficulty in understanding that,
in reality, the writing of malpractice insurance had become so hazardous
that most of the insurance industry really would have preferred to
abandon the business altogether. The premiums at which these companies could profitably write liability coverage were so astronomical
that the companies were embarrassed to even quote figures. This situation was dramatically illustrated when I requested, and was granted,
permission to meet with the Board of Directors of the Indiana Insurers
Institute, an association of all the companies writing casualty insurance
in the State of Indiana. None of these companies was writing malpractice insurance, with the exception of one company that wrote some
excess coverage. I was soliciting support for the Indiana bill which we
were preparing and the Institute had an experienced and influential
,4 Indianapolis Star, Dec. 20, 1974, at 1, col. 1.
ISIndianapolis Star, Dec. 21, 1974, at 1, col. 3, and Dec. 24, 1974, at 1, col. 1.
16Fort Wayne News-Sentinel, Nov. 14, 1974, at 2B p. 11, col. 1.
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lobby. I outlined the proposed bill and our plan of presentation, emphasizing that I sought only assurances that they would not oppose our
efforts. These assurances I obtained with one condition which was stated
quite clearly: the bill would contain no provision which could require
the insurers, under any circumstances, to become involved in insuring
the liability of doctors or other health care providers. The insurance
writers made it crystal clear that such business was no longer attractive
to them and that they wanted no part of it. Only with such assurances
could I elicit from them a promise of "no opposition" to our bill. In
subsequent consultations it was with considerable difficulty that I was
able to convince the Indiana State Medical Association's Board of
Directors that this really represented the attitude of the insurance industry in Indiana.
Not only did a substantial segment of the medical population feel
that lawyers were a part of their problem, but they were also highly
critical of a vital adjunct of the legal system, the contingency fee,
which they felt was an abomination which should be abolished. Of
course, many reputable lawyers feel that there should be no controls
whatsoever placed upon the contingency fee arrangements." Nevertheless, some observers feel that in some instances there has been sufficient abuse of the contingency fee to warrant controls. Certainly, a
flat 50 percent contingency fee, plus expenses, is not justifiable, and
has been judicially condemned.' 8 On the other hand, it is difficult to
argue against the old adage that the contingency fee is "the poor man's
ticket to the court house." Those of us who were involved in drafting
the Indiana legislation had to work long and hard to try to convince
doctors that the contingency fee concept should be retained, and that
it is an important element of our judicial system. The authors agreed,
however, with the doctors that there should be some control of contingency fees, and we advocated adoption of the New Jersey law which
provides a sliding scale for determining contingency fees.' 9 Unfortun7

' F. MACKINNIN, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERviCES (1964) presents a detailed
analysis of the contingent fee system in the United States and offers criticisms and proposals for regulation.
"8See, e.g., Vaughan v. Atkinson, 206 F. Supp. 575 (E.D. Va. 1962); In re Cohn, 46
N.J. 202, 216 A.2d 1 (1966).
'9 N.J. SuP. CT. R. 1:21-7 (c), adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court in 1971,
effective Jan. 31, 1972, reads as follows:
(c) In any matter where a client's claim for damages is based upon the alleged tortious conduct of another, including products liability claims, and the client
is not a subrogee, an attorney shall not contract for, charge, or collect a contingent
fee in excess of the following limits:
(1) 50% on the first $1000 recovered;
(2) 40% on the next $2000 recovered;
(3) 331 % on the next $47,000 recovered;
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ately, we were not completely successful in having our recommendations
in this connection adopted by the Indiana legislature, where the bar is,
of course, quite influential.
As a matter of fact, opponents to fee control have a strong argument. They point out that doctors, for the most part, are at liberty to
contract with their patients for their fee. Price control has never been
a very popular concept among business and professional men. Why
shouldn't the plaintiff's lawyer be at liberty to contract with his client?
Eventually the argument was settled by compromise, and the Act now
provides for no control over the attorney's fees relative to the first
$100,000 of recovery, with a 15 percent maximum contingency fee on
any recovery over and above this amount.2 Frankly, the doctors are
still not happy about the contingency fee and sincerely feel that the
sliding scale formula is the most equitable arrangement. It is their
position, also not without merit, that the insurance premium dollar
would go further if less of it went into the lawyer's pocket.
There is another institution which has been sanctified by the legal
profession but about which the physician is at best skeptical. This is
the jury system. Many doctors are convinced that the excessive verdicts
which are driving insurance premiums upward are the consequence of
a clever lawyer's ability to make an emotional appeal to a jury, irrespective of the merits of the controversy. To some extent, certainly, this
contention cannot be denied. This writer, though it may sound like
heresy coming from a trial lawyer, must confess to some skepticism
concerning the value of the jury system in the malpractice action,
and to doubt about whether its benefits are outweighed by its costs.
In the malpractice action, there is a limited insurance base, but
tremendous exposure. For example, in Indiana there are fewer than
5,000 practicing physicians, or insureds; yet everyone goes to a doctor so that the physician's exposure to a claim is quite substantial.
By comparison, there are approximately one million persons in Indiana
driving automobiles. Again, almost all citizens are potentially exposed
to an auto injury but, while there are only 5,000 "insureds" in the
malpractice field, there are approximately one million "insureds" in
(4) 20% on the next $50,000 recovered;
(5) 10% on any amount recovered over $100,000; and
(6) where the amount recovered is for the benefit of an infant or incompetent
and the matter is settled without trial the foregoing limits shall apply, except that
the fee on any amount recovered up to $50,000 shall not exceed 25%.
The rule was upheld in American Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. New Jersey Supreme Ct., 66 NJ.
258, 330 A.2d 350 (1974).
20
IND. CODE § 16-9.5-5-1(a) (Burns Sunn. 1075)-
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the automobile field. Consequently, there are many more premium
dollars to pay automobile claims than there are to pay malpractice
claims. Since the exposure is almost as great in one instance as in
the other, the malpractice premium is much more costly than the auto
premium. It has been difficult for both doctors and legislators to realize
that this is part of the problem.
Most of the exorbitant malpractice verdicts, ranging from one to
seven million dollars for a single injury, have been rendered by juries."
These awards are obviously a consequence, at least in part, of jury
sympathy or prejudice. Itwas for this reason that the attorneys for the
Indiana State Medical Association, employed to draft a malpractice bill,
recommended removal of the malpractice action from the jury system,
and replacement of the jury with a review board composed of two physicians appointed by the Indiana State Medical Association, two lawyers appointed by the Indiana State Bar Association, and two laymen
appointed by the governor.22 It was believed by the doctors that such a
tribunal would be more responsible in recognizing a meritorious claim
and more realistic in its award. This writer felt that a question of
weighing values was involved. On one hand, the drafters had to acknowledge that our proposal constituted some erosion of the traditional
judicial system with its emphasis on jury determinations. On the other
hand, we felt that such an approach might be worth the cost when
measured against the potential destruction of the medical profession as
we have known it.
It is still my belief that the board concept will prove to be, at worst,
a noble experiment. It may even prove an indispensable element of the
solution to the problem, despite its apparently revolutionary nature. The
fact is that there are a number of academicians who have questioned the
value of the jury system in the civil action in any case.2" The acute
medical malpractice problem can only fan that smoldering fire.
In summary, I believe it can be authoritatively stated that it is the
general opinion of the Indiana State Medical Association that the original bill,2" as it passed the House of Representatives, was a better law
than that which finally evolved. It was better because:
21 Law Professor J.B. Dunlop, who teaches courses in civil liability for personal injuries, including medical malpractice, at the University of Toronto, pointed out that only
half of all personal injury actions in Canada are tried by juries and that awards are much
smaller than awards in the United States, particularly in medical malpractice cases.
Welch, Medical Malpractice in Canada, CommissioN REPORT, Appendix 849, at 852.
22 H.R. 2063 § 8, 99th Ind. Gen. Assembly (1975).
23 See Steuer, The Case Against the Jury, 47 N.Y.S.B.J. 101 (1975); but see Knittel &
Aeiler, The Merits of Trial by Jury, 30 CAmn. L.J. 316 (1972).
24 H.R. 2063, 99th Ind. Gen. Assembly (1975).
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(1) The Patients' Compensation Board provided a more experienced and stable tribunal for litigation of the technical issues generally
involved in a malpractice action.
(2) It provided for expeditious handling of the malpractice claim,
impossible under the current judicial system, yet retained the substantive
tort law and conventional avenues for judicial appeal.
(3) All reasonable costs, including claimant's expert witness fees,
could be assessed against the responsible health care provider.
(4) It provided for punitive damages in appropriate cases.
(5) It provided for a reasonable schedule of benefits and guidelines
for damage awards.
(6) It provided for payment of unlimited expenses for maintenance
of life or health in the case of catastrophic injury.
(7) It provided a reasonable sliding scale contingency fee schedule,
insuring that more of the malpractice award went into the patient's
pocket.
(8) It eliminated attack by collateral sources (the subrogated claim
of Blue Cross-Blue Shield, for example).
All of this would have been accomplished without further burden
upon the taxpayer or the health care provider's liability insurer.
Clearly, it is the physician's belief that the law enacted by the 1975
Indiana Legislature constituted a giant step forward in the cure of an
acute problem. If the patient suffers a relapse, it is the physician's firm
belief that more radical surgery, in the form of legislation incorporating
the above-mentioned features of the original bill, will be necessary to
remove all of the malignancy.

